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PARENTAL PREFERENCES AND SELECTIVE
ABORTION: A COMMENTARY ON ROE v.
WADE, DOE v. BOLTON, AND THE
SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
RICHARD DELGADO*
JUDITH DROZ KEYES**
After balancing the interests involved, the Supreme Court in Roe
v. Wade' held that the state's interests in protecting the fetus and the
health of the mother are outweighed, at least initially, by the mother's
interest in obtaining an abortion.2 Both state interests, however, grow
in substantiality as the pregnancy advances, and at different points,
corresponding roughly with the end of the first and the second tri-
mesters, become compelling.' As these points are reached, states may
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1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 150-64. At times the Court speaks of the right to an abortion without
mentioning the woman's role in the process, stating, for example, that the decision
"must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."
Id. at 164. At other times the opinion speaks of the decision to abort as one that
must be made by the woman and her physician. E.g., id. at 163. Inclusion of the
physician in the decision-making process seems inconsistent with the rationale of the
decision, namely, the woman's right to privacy, and has been criticized as "medical elit-
ism." Comment, Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution and Its Impact, 3 EcoLoGY L.Q.
311, 329-30 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution].
3. 410 U.S. at 163.
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begin to regulate with increasing stringency the conditions under
which abortions may be performed, and after the sixth month may pro-
hibit abortions entirely except when they are necessary to protect the
health or life of the mother.4
In upholding the mother's right to an abortion, the Court recognized
a number of potential psychological and physical "detriments" con-
fronting pregnant women who are denied the choice of abortion.' But
one question not addressed by the Court in Roe or its companion case,
Doe v. Bolton,0 is whether there are other maternal interests or detri-
ments; nor did the Court consider whether, if there are additional in-
terests, they would prove sufficiently compelling to override counter-
vailing state interests. In particular, the Court did not consider
whether a decision to abort based on advance knowledge of certain
characteristics of the fetus would also be protected by the mother's
right to privacy. The opinions were simply silent on this issue, and
the novelty of the questions raised by selective abortion, as well as
the obvious implications of this practice for genetic engineering," make
a legal and constitutional inquiry timely and important. In addition
to providing an advance view of some of the dilemmas that more
sophisticated methods of human genetic engineering will pose ten or
twenty years hence,8 analysis of selective abortion can provide new
insight into the dynamics of the recent abortion decisions and their
implications for the debate concerning the beginnings of human life.
I
Selective abortion can be employed in a number of ways to assure
the birth of children with certain predesignated characteristics. The
following illustrations suggest only some of the many possibilities that
ingenious parents could devise. Each technique has its own advan-
tages in terms of time,9 cost,' 0 and safety,": as well as its disadvan-
4. Id. at 163-64.
5. Id. at 153.
6. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
7. Genetic engineering is the application of genetic principles to modify certain
traits of future generations. See generally Davies, Prospects for Genetic Intervention
in Man, 170 ScmNCE 1279 (1972); Nagle, Genetic Engineering, BULL. ATOMIC Sc.,
Dec. 1971, at 43.
8. See text accompanying notes 38-42 infra. See also notes 45-49 infra and ac-
companying text.
9. If immediate results are desired, it will be advantageous to be able to select
at one time from among the largest possible amount of genetic material. Thus, selec-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
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tages. Each appears to be within the capacity of presently existing
medical technology.' 2
A. Multiple Fetuses
1. Arbitrary Abortion of a Selected Number
A married couple, Mr. and Mrs. Particular, had been childless for
the five years of their marriage. Desperate to conceive a child, the
couple consulted a local medical specialist in human fertility who, after
performing a few initial tests, informed the couple that their chances
of having a child were almost nonexistent."3 The woman, it appeared,
ovulated only infrequently and irregularly. 14 When less drastic meas-
ures failed to produce results, the physician proposed that Mrs. Parti-
cular receive the "fertility drug," clomiphene citrate.'5 She readily
agreed. A few months later, Mrs. Particular was elated to discover
that she was pregnant. Her joy turned to shock, however, when dur-
ing a routine examination the doctor, listening through his stethoscope,
tive abortion among multiple fetuses would be indicated. See notes 13-29 infra and
accompanying text.
10. Since partial abortion amounts to major abdominal surgery, the costs would be
fairly high. Simple abortion of single fetuses, in contrast, ranges in cost from about
$150 to $700, depending on the stage of pregnancy and the occurrence of complica-
tions. Almost all abortions are performed within the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy
and require only a five-hour visit to a clinic. Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution
339. Thus, for the woman willing to wait a few months, serial abortion, see notes
30-33 infra and accompanying text, would normally be the indicated procedure.
1I. No statistics exist on the safety of partial abortion. Any operation that in-
volves opening the abdominal cavity, however, is accompanied by significant risk. On
this ground alone a physician's refusal to perform the operation might be justified under
the rationale of Roe. See 410 U.S. at 163-64; Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 30 (1973). Some indication of the risk involved can be gained from the com-
plication rate for abortions performed after the thirteenth week, which is on the order
of 22%. Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution 339.
12. See notes 19, 34-40 infra and accompanying text.
13. Approximately 10% of all couples experience some degree of difficulty in con-
ceiving because of organic disorder. G. PNcus, Tim CONTROL OF FERTLrrY 24
(1965).
14. Ovulatory disturbances are among the most common causes of female sterility.
Id. at 197; see notes 15 & 17 infra and sources cited therein.
15. Clomiphene citrate, a nonsteroid synthetic organic compound, is commonly
used to treat female infertility due to ovulatory problems. Murthy, Parekh & Arronet,
Experience with Clomiphene and Disclomiphene, 16 INT'L J. FFRTrmry 66 (1971).
See also Johnson, Outcome of Pregnancies Following Clomiphene Citrate Therapy, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE Farm WORLD CONGRESS ON FERTMrrY AND STERiLrry 101 (1967).
Vol. 1974:2031
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announced that at least three, and possibly as many as five, distinct
heartbeats could be heard; 16 Mrs. Particular was due for a multiple
birth. 17  This result was not what Mrs. Particular had bargained for,
however, and she lost no time informing the physician that she re-
garded the prospect of raising five children as intolerable. Having to
care for five children, she declared, would doom her to a life of do-
mestic drudgery, possibly endangering her health, and would stretch
the family's finances to the breaking point. Mrs. Particular placed the
blame for her plight squarely on the shoulders of the physician who,
she felt, had not fully explained to her the possibility of multiple birth
as a side effect of the drug. Unless he "did something," she warned,
she would consult her attorney about a malpractice lawsuit.1 8
The doctor suggested an abortion; Mrs. Particular replied she had
already waited too long for a baby. Out of this impasse, the idea of
a partial abortion was born. The physician, who was also an obstetric
surgeon, would open Mrs. Particular's abdomen and remove all the
fetuses save one, which would be permitted to develop normally and
come to term. Relieved, the parties separated, the physician to re-
search the feasibility of the contemplated operation, Mrs. Particular
to consult with her attorney about the legality of the procedure under
Roe and Doe.
At their next meeting, the physician reported that his research indi-
cated that a partial abortion, while risky, appeared feasible.Y9 For her
16. The fetus' heart begins to beat early in the second month of pregnancy, B. PAT-
TEN, HuimAN EMBRYOLOGY 138 (2d ed. 1953), and can first be heard by the physician
sometime between the twelfth and eighteenth week. I. WILLIAMS, OBsTTCS 225
(1930).
17. Multiple pregnancy is a fairly frequent side effect of the various fertility-induc-
ing drugs. E.g., Johnson, supra note 15; Marshall & Wider, Results of HMG Therapy
for Anovulatory Infertility Using a Nonvarlable Treatment Schedule: Comparison with
Previous Reports, 22 FERTiLrry & STnm.rry 19, 23 (1971).
18. Failure to warn a patient about the possible side effects of a drug or therapeu-
tic procedure can constitute a cause of action for medical malpractice. Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790, 82
Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App.
2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy,
64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628 (1970). Where the course of treatment is purely elective-
that is, not essential to health-the duty to disclose possible side effects would presum-
ably be even higher than usual.
19. Although there are no reported cases, such an operation appears to be within
the capacity of the newly developed medical specialty known as fetology. In a leading
.rticle, three of the foremost physicians ill this specialty describe some of the surgical
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
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part, Mrs. Particular reported that her attorney, after reviewing the
abortion decisions, had advised her that her contemplated operation
was legal. Until the end of the second trimester, he had said, a wom-
an has virtually an unqualified right to an abortion. And, although
in other contexts the law has been reluctant to permit arbitrary selec-
tion of persons for unfavorable treatment, 20 fetuses are not "persons"
within the meaning of the Constitution. 21 Mrs. Particular and her doc-
tor then agreed to proceed with the operation, which was a complete
success. At present, the Particulars are the proud parents of a charm-
ing baby girl who, it is said, bears a striking resemblance to her
mother.
procedures that have been successfully performed on human fetuses, concluding that "a
fetus can be taken completely out of the uterus for a period of 30 minutes, be operated
upon, and be replaced without changes in fetal heart tone or EKG." Asensio, Figue-
roa-Longo & Pelegrina, Intrauterine Exchange Transfusions: A New Technic, 32 OB-
STETmiCS & GYNECOLOGY 350, 355 (1968). In another article, the same authors de-
scribe an operation in which the amniotic sac was opened, a corrective procedure per-
formed, and the sac closed with sutures. Asensio, Figueroa-Longo & Pelegrina, Intra-
uterine Exchange Transfusions, 95 J. OBSTETRCS & GYNECOLOGY 1129 (1966); cf.
Asensio, Surgical Treatment of Erythroblastosis Fetalis, in DIAGNOsIs AN>D TREATMENT
O0' FETAL DISORDERS 264 (K. Adamson ed. 1968). In summarizing their results, the
three authors state: "The absence of premature labor, the minimal trauma sustained
by the fetus, and the relatively long-term correction [of the condition] have led us to
believe that the procedure might be the safest [available]." Asensio, Figueroa-Longo &
Pelegrina, Intrauterine Exchange Transfusions, supra at 1133. See also Beck, Intra-
uterine Renal Surgery: Techniques for Exposing the Fetal Kidney During the Last Two-
Thirds of Gestation, 8 J. INVEsT. UROLOGY 182 (1970); Idriss & Boggs, Experimental
Intrauterine Surgery: Studies in Fetal Skin Healing, 27 INST. MED. CHICAGO PRoC. 93
(1971).
Such results suggest that surgeons, at least in some cases, will be able to abort some,
but not all, of a set of multiple fetuses. Interview with J. Emmet Lamb, M.D., Acting
Chairman, Department of Obstetrics & Gynecology, Stanford University Medical
School, in Stanford, Cal., Mar. 21, 1974. In some cases, the multiple fetuses may share
circulatory systems to such an extent that an operation to separate them would be diffi-
cult or impossible. Interview with Edward T. Bowe, M.D., Professor of Obstetrics &
Gynecology, Columbia University Medical School, in New York, N.Y., Mar. 21, 1974.
Such an operation might prove more difficult than the above-described operations on
single fetuses, since the human uterus is very sensitive to changes in size and circula-
tion. Interview with Alan Margolis, M.D., Professor of Gynecology & Obstetrics, Uni-
versity of California Medical Center, in San Francisco, Cal., Mar. 18, 1974.
Selection can, of course, be carried out more simply by means of serial pregnancy
and abortion. See notes 29-33 infra and accompanying text. The main advantage of
partial abortion is that it obtains the same results as selective serial abortion, but faster.
See note 9 supra.
20. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart, ., concurring).
21. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158-59 (1973).
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2. Abortion Based on Sex
A few weeks after the meeting with her doctor at which a selective
abortion was agreed upon, Mrs. Particular telephoned her doctor to
inquire into the feasibility of assuring that her baby be a boy.22 She
professed finding boys more physically attractive than girls. More-
over, males enjoy a superior position in present-day society, she felt,
and are thus better able to care for their parents in their old age.2"
Since there were at least three fetuses present, the chances should be
good, she suggested, that at least one of them would be a male. 4 By
aborting the females and leaving a single male to develop, she would
be able to realize her ambition of having a baby boy. Reluctantly,
the doctor agreed and ordered amniocentesis 2 and amnioscopy 20 to
determine in advance the sex of each fetus.
22. Parents seem to prefer male children by a substantial margin. See note 50 in-
Ira and accompanying text.
23. The average annual wage paid to a full-time white male worker in the United
States in a recent year was $7396; to a black male, $4777; to a white female, $4729;
and to a black female, $3194. PRESmETr'S TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S RIoHTS AND RE-
sPoNsiBIrITm, A MATrER OF SIMPLE JUSTICE 18 et seq. (1970). Women comprise
less than 3 % of the lawyers in the United States, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SOCIAL
& ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1971), and less than 19% of the members of college
and university faculties. Hearings on Discrimination Against Women Before the House
Special Subcomm. on Education & Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1970).
24. Where three non-identical fetuses are present, the probability that at least one
will be male is approximately 87%. Where there are four fetuses, the probability is on
the order of 94%. And if there are five fetuses, the probability increases to about 97%
that at least one will be male.
25. Amniocentesis is a technique in which a small quantity of fluid is extracted
transabdominally by means of a small-gauge needle. Local anesthesia is generally used.
The fluid contains fetal cells, which can be analyzed through chromosome karyotyping
or enzyme assay, revealing many characteristics of the fetus, including sex and the pres-
ence or absence of certain chromosomal defects. Omenn & Motulsky, Intra-Uterine Di-
agnosis and Genetic Counselling: Implications for Psychiatry in the Future 2 (to be
published in October 1974 in 6 AMERICAN HANDBooK OF PSYCHIATRY (3d ed. D. Ham-
burg & H. Brodie 1974); on file at law library, University of California-Berkeley)
[hereinafter cited as Omenn & Motulsky]. See also notes 31 & 35 infra.
26. Amnioscopy involves introducing a flexible fiberoptic device into the uterine
cavity. It permits the physician to look at the fetus "eyeball to eyeball." Still at the
experimental stage, the technique involves some risk, but it permits the physician to
detect deformities such as cleft lip or open spine that could not be detected through
other means. Interview with Gilbert S. Omenn, M.D., Ph.D., White House Fellow &
Staff Assistant to the Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and Professor of
Medical Genetics, University of Washington, in Washington, D.C., Jan. 3, 1974. See
Omenn & Motulsky 11, 25; Saling, Amnioscopy and Fetal Blood Sampling, in DiAoNO-
sis AND T tEATmENT OF FERAL DisoRDEts 141 (K. Adamson ed. 1968).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
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3. Selection Based on Race
Shortly before the operation, Mrs. Particular contacted the physician
for a third time. Swearing him to secrecy, she confided that both she
and her husband, a prominent local merchant, had Negro forebears.
The Particulars, although Caucasian in appearance, were concerned
that their son might betray the presence of his black ancestorsY.1 Mrs.
Particular requested that the physician examine each fetus, selecting
for survival the one with the lightest pigmentation and the least
negroid appearance. The woman's threat of a lawsuit very much in
his mind, the physician agreed to consult with a geneticist and an
embryologist about the feasibility of making a "racial" determination
In utero28 or at the time of the operation.2 9
B. Serial Abortion
Ms. Positive, thirty-five years old, already had one child, a boy,
when she discovered she was again pregnant. She was delighted,
since she had wanted to have two children. But, believing world
population growth to be a real and severe problem, Ms. Positive
thought she could not in good conscience have more than two children.
She was therefore especially concerned that this baby be exactly what
she wanted.
First, she of course wanted the child to be normal and healthy.
Aware that her age meant a higher probability of a defective fetus,3"
Ms. Positive decided to risk amniocentesis in order to discover whether
27. Although as a general rule the pigmentation of a child approximates the av-
erage of the pigmentation of the biological parents, some variation is possible, and a
child of two parents each of whom has a Negro forebear could be substantially darker
in appearance than either parent. Interview with Charles Blank, Ph.D. (genetics), in
Berkeley, Cal., Feb. 12, 1974.
28. Although race-related characteristics cannot reliably be predicted from amnio-
centesis at the present time, fetal skin biopsy guided by an amnioscope should permit
the examining physician to make an approximate determination of the eventual pig-
mentation of the child beginning about the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy. Inter-
view with Edward T. Bowe, supra note 19; see notes 26 supra & 58 infra. Geneticists
are also intrigued by the prospect of mapping chromosomal characteristics of human
populations; proposals have been made that such studies be carried out in relation to
populations from diverse habitats and races, see Sharma, Chromosome Studies in Man:
Present Trends, 14 NUCLEUS 171 (1973), and it seems possible that even earlier detec-
tion might be possible one day through analysis of fetal cells in the amniotic fluid.
29. See note 58 infra and sources cited therein.
30. Omenn & Motulsky 7.
Vol. 1974:203] 209
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the fetus evidenced any chromosomal defect."1 If the fetus were
genetically defective she intended to have an abortion.8 2  Second, Ms.
Positive wanted her next child to be female. She already had a male
child, and felt a "balanced" family was desirable, both for herself and
for the children."3
When amniocentesis revealed that the fetus Ms. Positive was carry-
ing was normal but male, she made the difficult decision to abort. A
few months later, Ms. Positive again became pregnant. This time
amniocentesis showed the fetus to be normal and female. Ms. Posi-
tive happily carried the fetus to term, and she and her son are now
very pleased with her new daughter.
II
Selective abortion of the type employed by Ms. Positive is unques-
tionably possible with existing medical techniques.8" Amniocentesis,
already a relatively common procedure,8 5 is performed primarily to re-
veal genetic defects,3 6 but it also reveals the sex of the fetus.87
31. The primary use of amniocentesis to date has been to enable the physician to
detect chromosomal abnormalities in the fetus. NATIONAL FOUNDATION-MARCH OF
DIMES, Bm'H DEFECTS, OwRmAL ARTICLE Smus : INTRAUTERINE DIAGNOSIS (1971)
[hereinafter cited as INTRAuTERmE DIAGNOSIS]; Omenn & Motulsky 4-5.
32. The presence of a genetic defect was considered adequate justification for an
abortion in many states even before Roe and Doe. The Model Penal Code, for exam-
ple, permits an abortion once it is determined that "the fetus would likely be born with
a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or physical defect." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). This proposal, which was partially invali-
dated by Doe, served as a model for legislation in about one-fourth of the states, 410
U.S. at 182. Other states had adopted "liberalized" statutes that permitted abortion on
eugenic grounds. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (McKinney 1967), as amended,
(Supp. 1973); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 n.37 (1973). Many persons find
abortion of a defective fetus less objectionable than abortion of a normal fetus. Lieber-
man, Psychosocial Aspects of Selective Abortion, in I[NrAuTErNE DIAGNOSIS 20.
33. Many couples prefer to have a family with a certain ratio of boys to girls.
Spraic, Sexual Selection and the Law, 20 CoLoRao Q. 516, 522-23 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Spraic].
34. See notes 24-26 supra & 35-40 infra and accompanying text.
35. For example, amniocentesis has been performed 285 times at the Prenatal De-
tection Center at the University of California Medical Center in San Francisco, Cal-
ifornia. S.F. Chronicle & Examiner, Mar. 3, 1974, at 18, col. 2. It is considered a
relatively safe and painless medical procedure. Fuchs, Amniocentesis and Abortion:
Methods and Risks, in INTRAUTERINE DIAGNOSIS 18, 18-19; Scrimgeour, Amniocentesis:
Techniques and Complications, in ANTENATAL DIAGNOSIS OF GENETIc DISEASE 11 (A.
Emery ed. 1973).
36. See notes 25 & 31 supra and accompanying text.
37. Omenu & Motulsky 4.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
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Amnioscopy, while still experimental, will soon be available for use
by trained specialists.38 This procedure will allow a physician literally
to look at the fetus while it is in utero.39 Partial abortion of the type
requested by Mrs. Particular has yet to be performed in the post-Roe
United States, but developments in the field of fetology indicate that
such an operation is within the capability of surgeons specializing in
this field of medicine.4°
The possibilities of combining these modem screening techniques
with post-Roe permissive abortion have not been lost on a few alert
and determined parents; already the medical literature contains refer-
ences to requests for selective abortion based on sex, 41 and race cannot
be far behind. 2 It is likely that requests for selective abortion will
increase as the diagnostic tests become safer, more accurate, and more
complete in the information they reveal about the fetus, and as the
possibility of selective childbearing becomes more widely known or is
38. See notes 26 supra & 40 infra and accompanying text. Other techniques that
are used to inspect the fetus are fetography and ultrasound scanning. In the former
procedure, a solution is injected into the amniotic sac, outlining the fetus' skin and fill-
ing the gastrointestinal tract. A. MILUNSKY, Tr PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS OF HEREDITARY
DisoimERs 184 (1973). Ultrasound is used to detect a number of gross defects in the
fetus. Id. at 186.
39. A. MILTUNsKY, supra note 38, at 186.
40. For a vivid description of the work of a leading fetologist, see Rorvik, The
Brave New World of the Unborn, LOOK, Nov. 4, 1969, at 74. Dr. Asensio of the Uni-
versity of Puerto Rico School of Medicine has performed a number of corrective opera-
tions on fetuses. In one case, Dr. Asensio removed one embryo completely from the
womb, performed the corrective procedure, then replaced it in the womb thirty minutes
later. Id. at 76. Fetologists have injected dye into the amniotic fluid to illuminate
the fetus' gastrointestinal tract, and have performed blood transfusions on fetuses while
they were still attached to the mothers' bodies. There are amnioscopes in experimental
use "through which you can view the fetus and introduce tiny knives to take fetal blood
and skin samples." Id. at 80. See also note 19 supra and sources cited therein.
41. E.g., Letter to the Editor ("An Abuse of Prenatal Diagnosis"), 221 J.A.M.A.
408 (1972); Omenn & Motulsky 29; cf. Fried, Indications for Amniocentesis, in AN-
TENATAL DIAGNOSIS OF GENETIc DISEASE 4, 8 (A. Emery ed. 1973) ("Parents may
wish to know the sex of the fetus for personal reasons, with interruption of the preg-
nancy if the fetus is not of the desired sex. . . ."); S.F. Chronicle & Examiner, Mar. 3,
1974, at 18, col. 2 ("Sex Prediction Fad Gains Popularity--cites interview with Dr.
Mitchell S. Golbus at meeting of California Medical Association); Curtis, Abortion for
Babies of the Wrong Sex?, S.F. Chronicle, July 3, 1973, at 19, col. 3 (referring to re-
port from Dr. Mortimer Stenchever, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, University
of Utah College of Medicine; see Letter from Lindsay R. Curtis, M.D., Feb. 7, 1974,
on file at law library, University of California-Berkeley). A modest survey of college
students revealed that 80% would utilize a technique for selection of the sex of their
children if such a technique were available. Spraic 523.
42. See notes 57-62 infra and accompanying text.Washington University Open Scholarship
212 WASMNGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:203
discovered by the popular media.43 Whether there exist any legal
bars to selective abortion remains to be seen; no suit has yet been
brought to challenge the procedure, and no state has introduced legis-
lation attempting to regulate it.44
Certainly, selective abortion is only the tip of the iceberg, a crude
forerunner of more sophisticated methods of human engineering to be
developed in the future.45  Already, medical scientists have devised
a technique that affords an eighty percent certainty of selecting the
sex of one's child,48 and a, method of separating male and female
sperms by centrifugation may soon be perfected.4  Manipulation of
the DNA in human sperm and ova tissue, which offers almost un-
limited possibilities for tailoring children to parental specifications, has
attracted considerable interest among genetic researchers,4" and the
first attempt at reproducing a human being asexually, by cloning, can
be expected by the end of the century.49
43. Motulsky, Fraser & Felsenstein, Public Health and Long-Term Genetic Implica-
tions of Intrauterine Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, in INTRAUTERINE DrAoISS 22,
30; see Frankel, The Specter of Eugenics, COMMENTA.Y, Mar. 1974, at 25; note 41
supra and sources cited therein; cf. Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution 311 (suggests
that "the primary effect of legalization will be an improvement in the quality of the
abortion operations, rather than an increase in the quantity of operations performed")
(headnote); id. at 344.
44. Some states have attempted to limit the impact of Roe and Doe in other ways,
however. For example, following the Supreme Court's decisions, Rhode Island at-
tempted to put into effect a statute purporting to define human life as beginning at
the moment of conception. The statute was held unconstitutional on its face in Doe
v. Israel, 358 F. Supp. 1193 (D.R.I. 1973). For a discussion of other legislative re-
sponses to the decisions, see Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution 331-32.
45. For a discussion of the possible impact on human society of developments in
human engineering, see Davies, supra note 7; Etzioni, Sex Control, Science, and Soci-
ety, 161 SCEENCE 1107 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Etzionil; Rivers, Grave New World,
SATuRDAY Rtv., Apr. 8, 1972, at 23. See also A. ErzIONx, GENETC Fix (1973) [here-
inafter cited as GmnTIc Fix].
46. Spraic describes a technique developed by Landrum B. Shettles, M.D., Professor
of Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology at Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons,
for selecting the sex of children prior to conception. The technique evidently is based
on older discoveries relating to acid-alkali balance. Spraic 521.
47. Id. at 519-20.
48. E.g., GENETIC Fix 50; Omenn & Motulsky 2.
49. See GEisurC Fix 20, 71; A. MLuNSEy, supra note 38, at 177; Kindregan, State
Power Over Human Fertility and Individual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1401, 1416-18
(1972); cf. Spraic 517-18.
Dr. Douglas Bevis, a leading English researcher in human reproduction, recently an-
nounced to the British Medical Association that he had participated in a successful ex-
periment in which the ova of three infertile women were removed, fertilized in the lab-
oratory, and reimplanted in the women's wombs. Dr. Bevis maintained that the womenhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
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Undoubtedly, many of these procedures will work imperfectly at
first, and mistakes will be made. It will thus be necessary to rely on
amniocentesis and other techniques to monitor the development of the
made-to-order child; when observation shows that the fetus is not de-
veloping according to plan, it will be a simple matter to abort it and
begin again. Thus, until highly reliable techniques are available,
selective abortion will be necessary as a corrective measure of last re-
sort.
What are the implications for the social order if these practices be-
come commonplace? Studies carried out by behavioral scientists indi-
cate that married couples prefer male children over female by a con-
siderable margin, perhaps on the order of sixty-one to thirty-nine."°
Yet it has been suggested that even a slight additional imbalance in
the ratio of the sexes could substantially alter many aspects of our na-
tional life."' A society dominated by males, it is said, would tend to
take on the rough-hewn characteristics of a frontier town.52 Men tend
to be more aggressive and acquisitive than women.53 By contrast,
women purchase more books, support music and cultural programs,
and tend toward pacifistic values in politics and international rela-
tions.54  Proportionately more women than men support the Demo-
cratic party;55 a change in the sex ratio of the population could thus
alter the present balance of two-party power.
subsequently gave birth to three "perfectly normal" children. See NEwsWEEE, July 29,
1974, at 70.
50. Spraic and Etzioni have reviewed the major studies in this area. Spraic con-
cludes that governmental intervention may be needed in order to curb the adverse ef-
fects of sexual imbalance. Spraic 522-25, 527. See also GENETIC Fix 16, 30. But
see G. TAYLOR, THE BIoLOoIcAL. TiME BomB 207 (1968) (arguing that sexual imbal-
ance is unlikely to result). Those who discount the danger of imbalance often base
their faith on the intervention of an "invisible hand" that will set things right. Etzioni
1109. Others argue that a "free market" of choices will act to rectify any threatened
imbalance. Id. This theory, although perhaps partly correct, may underestimate the
extent to which parental preferences for male children are rooted in unconscious psy-
chic factors, including very basic (even Freudian) attitudes about fathers and parent-
hood. Id.
51. Etzioni 1109.
52. Id. Manifestly, this and the following conclusions are predicated on societal
role-typing and notions of female inferiority. Such attitudes, it is hoped, are bound
for extinction as society realizes that they are merely learned patterns and not the re-
flection of "innate" differences between the sexes. In the meantime, however, their ef-
fect cannot be ignored.
53. Id.
54. Cf. id.
55. Id.
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These forecasts, while speculative and even fanciful-sounding, may
well contain an element of truth. The simple fact is that no one really
knows for certain what effects would follow from parental selection
that resulted in a noticeable skewing of the population. Such selec-
tion, if persisted in over a period of time, could easily produce perma-
nent changes in the frequency of appearance of certain genetic traits,
and it is even conceivable that certain human characteristics would dis-
appear completely. 50 Minority racial features, like any other gross,
readily identifiable traits that are regarded by large numbers of per-
sons as unesthetic or undesirable,57 would be prime candidates for ex-
tinction. Skin pigmentation is detectible fairly early in pregnancy, 8
and other race-like characteristics such as facial features and patterns
of hair growth make their appearance at various points in the develop-
ment of the fetus.5 9 The rise of ethnic consciousness among minority
groups ° offers some assurance that selective abortion would not be
universally adopted among minority families as a means of eradicating
racially distinctive features, but the "marry light" mentality still per-
sists among middle-class black families, 61 and favoritism toward "el
guerito" (the light-skinned one) is far from extinct in Chicano cul-
ture. 62 Of course, a pregnant woman of the majority race who is anx-
56. Motulsky, Fraser & Felsenstein, supra note 43, at 22-26; see Ackerman, Bio-
logical Consequences of Population Control, 17 INr'L J. FERTILITY 131, 131-34 (1972).
57. See generally E. FRAzmER, Race Contacts and the Social Structure, in ON RACE
RELATONS 43 (1968).
58. Cells indicative of negroid pigmentation begin to appear about the fourteenth
week. Sagebiel & Odland, Ultrastructural Identication of Melanocytes in Early Hu-
man Embryos, in PIGMENTATION: ITS GENESIS AND BIOLOGIC CONTROL 43, 44 (V.
Riley ed. 1972). The degree of pigmentation can be assessed visually with increasing
accuracy in the following months. See generally A. ZIMMERMAN & S. BECKER, MELAN-
OBLASTS AND MELANOCYTES IN FETAL NEGRO SKIN (1959). For a description of am-
nioscopy, which permits the physician visually to examine the developing fetus and
even remove skin and blood samples, see notes 26, 35 & 40 supra.
59. See generally B. PATrEN, supra note 16.
60. See Drake, Prospects for the Future, in KEY IssuEs IN THE AFRO-AMERICAN
EXPEmENCE 285, 299 (N. Huggins ed. 1971); Leime, The Concept of the New Negro
and the Realities of Black Culture, in id. at 125.
61. In a classic work, E. Franklin Frazier observed that because Negroes, since the
days of slavery, had been taught to see their black skin as a curse and a sign of their
inferiority to whites, great value was placed on a light complexion by Negroes them-
selves. One aspect of this phenomenon was that having a light-skinned spouse also
came to be perceived as desirable. E. FRAZIER, Black Bourgeoisie, in ON RACE RELA-
TIONS 243 (1968). Although rising awareness among ethnic groups, see note 60 supra
and accompanying text, may have lessened the impact of this attitude, it is unlikely
to disappear totally in the near future.
62. See L. GREBLER, J. MOORE & R. GuZMAN, THE MEXICAN AMERICAN PEOPLEhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
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ious to conceal an extramarital affair with a man of minority race, or
vice versa, might have an extremely strong incentive for ascertaining
in advance the characteristics of her fetus.
In addition to private incentives, economic and even governmental
pressures might encourage parents to take steps to assure that their
children bear certain characteristics that are believed desirable. Since
females have a longer life expectancy than males and Caucasians out-
live blacks,6 3 it has been suggested that sellers of group life insurance
policies might offer financial advantages to families who agreed in ad-
vance to bear only children likely to be longlived.64 In wartime, the
advantage to the Government in having large numbers of males is evi-
dent. 5  Indeed, following both world wars the Soviet Union instituted
a national program of incentives designed to increase the birth rate."'
Because of the disproportionate number of females resulting from
battle casualties among the male population, 7 there is little doubt that
the Soviet government would have embraced a program of selective
male birth had the techniques for effectuating it been available.
In the United States, state intervention in favor of fetal selection
is perhaps less likely, but the declining birth rate"' and the resulting
emphasis on the qualitative aspect of family life 9 may well have the
same effect through the working of individual choices. Once the
potential inherent in fetal screening becomes known, it is difficult to
334-35 (1970); E. STODDARD, MaEXCAN AMERIcANs 80-84 (1973); cf. A. PaxGo,
SrXANoEas IN THER OwN LAND 3, 10 (1973).
63. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMINISTRA-
TION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 57
(1973).
64. Interview with Gilbert S. Omenn, supra note 26.
65. E.g., Spraic 528. For discussion of the constitutional aspects of governmental
involvement in controlling human reproduction, see Kindregan, supra note 49; Mont-
gomery, The Population Explosion and United States Law, 22 HAsTINGs LJ. 629
(1971); Rabin, Population Control Through Financial Incentives, 23 HASTINGS LJ.
1353 (1972).
66. D. DALLIN, THE CHANom WORLD OF SOVIET RUSSIA 30 et seq. (1956); Eason,
Population Changes, in PROSPECTS FOR SOvIET SOCiTY 203, 223 (A. Kassof ed. 1970).
67. D. DALLIN, supra note 66, at 40-41; Eason, supra note 66, at 225-30.
68. The birth rate for both blacks and whites has decreased steadily since 1955.
In that year 23.8 white babies and 34.7 black (and "other") babies were born per thou-
sand living persons. The preliminary figures for 1970 show this statistic to be about
15.5 white and 25.2 black babies per thousand. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AR.
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 52 (1973).
69. Lieberman, supra note 32.
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see how, short of legislation, determined couples could be prevented
from exercising selection in the sex, and possibly other characteristics,
of their offspring if they are willing to incur the expense and inconven-
ience of an occasional trip to the doctor.
III
Assuming it desired to do so, could a state regulate, or a court en-
join, the use of selective abortion -by couples who desire to have chil-
dren of a certain type?70 Although Roe and Doe appear to permit
abortion "on demand,' '71 the precise issue of selective abortion was
not before the Court in either case and, until finally resolved by the
Court, should be regarded as an open question. It would be a mis-
take to suppose that simply because a woman need not give any rea-
son to justify an abortion, every reason is beyond judicial scrutiny.
After all, a landlord may rent or not rent an apartment at his or her
absolute discretion, even whim, but when the landlord decides to re-
fuse to rent to blacks, or to the foreign born, constitutional notions
of due process and equal protection enter the picture, limiting his or
her freedom of choice.72 This is not to suggest that a womb is exactly
70. A third alternative would be adoption of a position statement by the American
Medical Association (AMA) or the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists opposing selective abortion. The AMA has adopted such position statements in
the past. See Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates 221 (June 1970). Passage
of such a resolution does not seem likely, however, at least without legislation or a
judicial holding, since most physicians probably believe that Roe and Doe gave women
an unqualified right to any type of abortion. Even if such a statement were passed,
individual doctors might hesitate to adhere to it in light of what many might perceive
to be the clear mandate of Roe and Doe. Interview with Edward T. Bowe, supra note
19.
71. Although Roe permits states to regulate abortion in the interest of the mother's
health after the third month of pregnancy, 410 U.S. at 163, and to bar it completely
after the sixth month except to protect the life or health of the mother, id. at 163-
64, the view of many seems to be that abortion is now available at a woman's re-
quest. Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution 332, 339; cf. Dudar, Abortion for the
Asking, SATutRDAY Rv. oF Soc'v, Apr. 1973, at 35. Often overlooked is the require-
ment of the physician's concurrence. This requirement can pose serious difficulties for
the woman unable to find a willing physician, especially in small towns or Catholic
communities.
72. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948); Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). A federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), pro-
hibits all racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property. This statute was held
valid under the thirteenth amendment in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
SELECTIVE ABORTION
like an apartment with a nine-month leasehold; the relationship of
mother and child is both more intimate and momentous than that.
But it is important to realize that Roe's holding that a woman may
abort the contents of her uterus does not necessarily mean that she
may do so in order to reach any objectives whatsoever, including ones
that are constitutionally impermissible. 73
The mother's interest in privacy, which Roe held to include the right
to an abortion,74 is substantial enough to override the state's interests
in protecting the fetus and in regulating medical procedures in the in-
terest of the mother's health, at least during the first trimester of
pregnancy. But the mother's interest in privacy is not unlimited, and
at various points in her pregnancy it begins to be exceeded by the
state's interests.75  The introduction of additional interests into the
Court's equation might well affect the balance struck, compelling a
different result."6
When abortion is attempted on a selective basis, one such additional
state interest, mentioned earlier, is that of preventing alteration of the
demographic or genetic balance.77 If it could be shown that parental
preferences were likely to change the character of the population hi
undesirable or even unpredictable ways, the state would seem to have
a legitimate interest in resisting selective practices. Moreover, "fads"
or styles in babies could cause certain human characterstics to be re-
duced in frequency or to disappear. 78  A society committed to plural-
ism"9 might well decide to curb such a trend by forbidding the use
of selective abortion.
Society's interest would appear strongest when the endangered type
is one, such as race80 or sex,8' that courts traditionally have singled
73. See 410 U.S. at 163; cf. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (first
amendment's guarantee of free speech does not afford an absolute right to speak where,
when, or in the manner the speaker pleases).
74. 410 U.S. at 153, 163.
75. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text.
76. This possibility is present whenever a balancing test is used. See, e.g., Brand-
enburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
77. See notes 50-62 supra and accompanying text.
78. Id.
79. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILMMmA 167 et seq., 853 (1944); Drake, su-
pra note 60.
80. U.S. CoNsT. amends. XIII, XIV; see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
81. Although sex has not been declared a suspect classification by the Supreme
Vol. 1974:203]
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out for special protection. Fetuses are not "persons" in the constitu-
tional sense, as Roe made clear,8 but arguments can nonetheless be
made for extending them the state's protection from maternal choices
that threaten their existence. First, reduction in the number of chil-
dren born potentially affects the numerical and economic strength of
minority interest groups now in existence. 83  Groups such as the
NAACP and the National Organization for Women that rely in large
part on numerical strength to effect social change84 might well have
Court, four Justices urged that sex be recognized as a suspect class in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973), observing that "sex . . . is an immutable char-
acteristic determined solely by the accident of birth. . . ." See also Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971). In Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1971), the California Supreme Court recognized sex as a suspect classification.
The proposed equal rights amendment, H.R.J. Res. No. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), which would guarantee equality of rights regardless of sex, was passed by Con-
gress on March 22, 1972 and submitted to the legislatures of the states for ratification.
This proposed amendment was cited by three Justices in Frontiero as a reason for not
declaring sex a constitutionally suspect class at the present time. 411 U.S. at 692.
82. 410 U.S. at 157.
83. The Supreme Court has intervened a number of times to protect the interest
of minority groups from forced dilution of their political power. E.g., Hadnott v.
Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1969) (filing fees used to deter Negroes from running for politi-
cal office); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax require-
ment); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (gerrymandering Negro district);
cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). A writer has even suggested that a cause
of action for wrongful sex determination might be developed. Brodie, The New Biol-
ogy and the Prenatal Child, 9 J. FAMmY L. 391, 400-01 (1969).
84. Some black leaders have seen population growth in the black community as a
positive good and have resisted the establishment of birth control clinics as an attempt
by the white community to perpetrate genocidal policies on blacks. P. EHRLICH & A.
EHRLICH, POPULATION, REsOURCES, ENVIRONMENT: ISSuts IN HUMAN ECOLOGY 246-
47 (1970). That women comprise slightly more than 50% of the population has fre-
quently been cited as a reason why sex should not be declared a suspect classification
for purposes of equal protection analysis. E.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Despite this numerical preponderance, women are not equally represented, since societal
tradition has effectively precluded women from sitting in the legislatures, on the courts,
and in the executive chambers. See id. at 686 n.17; Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933-35 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Ely]. See generally K. DAvrnsoN, R. GINSLiNrG & H. KAY, Truer, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON SEX-BAsnn Discrl r NATIoN 99-107 (1973). This discrepancy is central to the
demands of many modem feminists, and the decisions in Roe and Doe may well have
been, in large part, a response to the pressures of large numbers of women. See Id.
at 404-05; Cisler, Unfinished Business: Birth Control and Women's Liberation, in
SISTmuOOD is PowmUzrL 245, 274-81 (R. Morgan ed. 1970). It seems safe to assume
that chances for the ratification of the equal rights amendment by the requisite thirty-
eight state legislatures are greatly enhanced by the fact that women comprise over one-
half of the constituencies of the legislators involved. See A. FERIusS, INDICATORS OF
TRENDS IN THE STATUS OF WOMEN 179-82 (1971).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
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cause to fear any diminution in numbers resulting from multiple abor-
tions of potential members.
In addition, the fetus, while not a person, is not nothing.8 5 As Pro-
fessor Ely has observed, the Government has routinely enacted legis-
lation to protect infrahuman life, such as dogs, and even inanimate
things like draft cards.8 6 These protections have been upheld even
in the face of contrary constitutional interests, such as free speech.87
As a result, to point out that the fetus has no constitutional right to
continue to exist, while the mother's interest is of constitutional dimen-
sion, is, in a way, beside the point. The state has many interests
which, while not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, are none-
theless protectible.88 One such non-constitutional interest suggested
by selective abortion is simply the concern that permitting human
fetuses to be weeded out on grounds that could be considered frivolous
or invidious would set an example of disrespect for human life.89 Pro-
tection of the public's morals has often been cited in justification of
statutes protecting animals or symbolic objects. Owners of American
flags, for example, may not display or destroy them in a manner cal-
culated to communicate disrespect or scorn for the national symbol."
Similarly, legislation for the protection of dogs and other domestic ani-
mals has frequently been enacted with the express purpose of prohibit-
ing behavior that might encourage an attitude of cruelty or unconcern
toward human life.91 Whether fetuses are more or less deserving of
85. Ely 931.
86. Id. at 926 & n.49.
87. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
88. Ely 926.
89. Id. at 924. For a more emotional attack on all permissive regulation of abor-
tion as furthering an anti-life attitude, see Brief for National Right to Life Foundation
as Amicus Curiae, cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 n.45 (1973).
90. A federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1970), makes it an offense punishable by
up to one year in prison and a fine of $1000 to "knowingly [ecast] contempt upon any
flag of the United States" by certain means. This statute has been held not to place
any restrictions on first amendment freedoms "greater than is essential to the further-
ance of the national interest." United States v. Gibson, 462 F.2d 96, 102 (9th Cir.
1972); see Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also
CAL. MiL. & VET. CoDE § 614 (Deering 1955), as amended, (Supp. 1974), held con-
stitutional in People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853, appeal dis-
missed, 396 U.S. 371 (1969).
91. Although cruelty to animals was not an offense under the common law, State
v. Karstendiek, 49 La. 1621, 22 So. 845 (1897), today most jurisdictions have enacted
statutes making the infliction of needless pain on animals a criminal offense. E.g.,
CAL. PENAL CObE § 597 et seq. (Deering 1971, Supp. 1974); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§
Vol. 1974-203]
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protection than animals has yet to be decided; at the moment their
status is simply that of a "potential of life."' 92  But the policy support-
ing animal protection statutes would appear to be equally applicable
to fetuses, and a state might well conclude that permitting abortions
on suspect or frivolous grounds would foster disrespect for potential
human life, which would in turn create disrespect for actual human
life. Recent legislation forbidding scientific experimentation with live
fetuses tends to corroborate this suggestion."
But partial or selective abortion does more than raise new state in-
terests that could upset the equation offered in Roe and Doe; the
countervailing interest of the mother seems proportionately weaker.
A woman who desires a selective abortion is not opposed to having
a baby; she simply wants a baby of type X and not type Y. Arguably,
the privacy interest involved in protecting this "fine tuning" is less de-
serving of protection than that involved when the interest is in not
bearing children at all." A defendant at a criminal trial, for example,
28.161-67 (1962, Supp. 1974); N.Y. AGRic. & MKTS. LAW § 350 et seq. (MeKinney
1972). Such statutes are often founded upon the need to preserve public morals. See
Hunt v. State, 3 Ind. App. 383, 29 N.E. 933 (1892); Stephens v. State, 65 Miss. 329,
3 So. 458 (1888). A few courts subscribe to the theory that animals have rights of
their own. E.g., State v. Karstendiek, supra at 1625, 22 So. at 847; Hodge v. State, 79
Tenn. 528 (1883). See also Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 794 (1958).
The Court in Roe rejected a related argument premised on public morals when it
dismissed an alleged state interest in discouraging promiscuity and illicit sexual conduct.
410 U.S. at 148. The state's interest in discouraging extramarital relations, however,
is arguably less weighty than its interest in opposing an attitude of disrespect toward
human life or the potential for life. See id. at 163; notes 1-4 supra and accompanying
text.
92. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
93. E.g., CAL. HALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (Deering Supp. 1974); MINN.
ANN. STAT. § 145.422 (Supp. 1974). On the federal level, an amendment to a House
Resolution banning fetal experimentation, H.R. Res. 7724, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973),
passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 354-9 on May 31, 1973, and is now
the subject of a joint conference with the Senate. A number of House bills were intro-
duced during the ninety-third Congress which would prohibit the use of federal funds
for fetal experimentation, e.g., H.R. 7850, 8778, 9488, or make it a crime to experiment
on human fetuses, e.g., H.R. 6849, 7725, 9459. All of these bills are still in committee.
94. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1973)
(state's obligation to supply basic education to children residing within state does not
require plan that guarantees perfect fiscal equality to each district).
Of course, choosing not to have a severely deformed child can be considered a type
of "fine tuning," too. But the interest involved in choosing not to give birth to such
a child is usually much stronger than that involved in choosing not to have a healthy
child simply because it is of the "wrong" sex, for example. See Omenn & Motulsky
29. The right to abort a defective child has been recognized since well before Roe
and Doe. See note 32 supra.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
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has the right to be provided with counsel 95 he or she has no right
to be represented by Clarence Darrow. 96
Many of the components of the privacy interest enumerated in
Roe-determination of family size, avoidance of medical or psycho-
logical harm resulting from bearing an unwanted child, the mental
and physical strain of caring for the child, and, in some cases, the
stigma of unwed motherhood9 7-- are absent or greatly weakened when
qualitative rather than quantitative selective criteria are used. The
financial cost, for example, of raising a blue-eyed boy is likely to be
no greater than that of raising a brown-eyed girl. And the increase
in family size is obviously the same regardless of a child's sex, eye
color, or skin pigmentation.
Moreover, to the extent that characterizing the woman's interest in
obtaining an abortion as an aspect of privacy represents something
more than a conceptual tour de force by the Supreme Court,98 that
interest may well be diminished when a woman elects to undergo the
probing and screening necessary to ascertain the characteristics of the
fetus inside her body.9 9 In actuality, the right invoked in Roe and
Doe probably was not privacy, at least not in the traditional sense, but
some entirely new interest. 100 Nevertheless, to the extent that the in-
terest in obtaining an abortion shares some of the features of the tradi-
tional interest in privacy, the standard defenses of waiver 1' and con-
sensual violation'0 may be available.
IV
Recent cases have demonstrated that privacy, like many other per-
sonal interests protected by the Constitution, is not an absolute
95. This guarantee has even been held to include the right to effective counsel.
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1947). See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHics Nos. 4, 15.
96. Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631
(1973); see Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1966); Tibbett v. Hand, 294 F.2d 68, 73 (10th
Cir. 1961).
97. 410 U.S. at 153.
98. See Ely 923-26, 928-37.
99. See notes 101-02 infra.
100. Ely 932. The author suggests that what is really involved in Roe is "the free-
dom to live one's life without governmental interference." Id.
101. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 817 (4th ed. 1971) (waiver by seeking pub-
licity).
102. Id. (defense of consent).
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right. 03 Rather, privacy is a limited and relative interest, whose
weight must be balanced against competing interests in each situa-
tion.104 Because unregulated use of selective abortion by private indi-
viduals potentially affects a number of traditional state interests, 05 and
because the parent's right to decide whether to bear a child is attenu-
ated when she is willing to have a child but not any child, 00 some
form of social regulation may be indicated. How should such regula..
tion be effected?
One possibility would be to prohibit physicians from divulging to
prospective parents any information about the fetus other than the
presence or absence of chromosomal defects. Such an approach
would be objectionable, however, on a number of grounds. First, it
comes perilously close to book-burning and state-enforced ignorance,
and may well run afoul of the first amendment.10 7  Second, it fails
to distinguish between abortion based on "suspect" characteristics, that
based on relatively harmless characteristics such as size of the fetus,
or that based on "frivolous" characteristics such as the presence or ab-
sence of dimples.108  Accordingly, this method of regulation should
be avoided.
A better approach might be to permit the parent to acquire informa-
tion about the fetus, but to prohibit abortion thereafter except for com-
pelling reasons of maternal health.'0 9 Such a statute could be drafted
103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). The limited nature of the right to do with one's body what one pleases,
in a medical context, has also been recognized in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927),
and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
104. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
105. See notes 50-62, 83-93 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 94-102 supra and accompanying text.
107. "Mhe State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
contract the spectrum of available knowledge." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965). See also Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
108. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
109. An argument can be made that such regulation should also take into account
the interest of the father, since his genetic contribution to the make-up of the fetus
amounts to roughly one-half. Although this interest would be unlikely to prevail in
the classic yes/no decision under consideration in Roe and Doe, when weighed against
the interest of the mother in not bearing an unwanted child, see, e.g., Jones v. Smith,
278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1486 (1974), selective abor-
tion presents a different constellation of interests, see notes 74-102 supra, and the out-
come may well be different. For a discussion of the father's interest, see Abortion:
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in terms of waiver:1 0 parents may enlist the aid of doctors to learn
what they can about the fetus, but the price is forfeiture of the right
to obtain an abortion. Such a statute could prohibit abortion based
on any criteria, or only suspect criteria such as race or sex. Alter-
natively, abortion based on race or sex could be limited to parents
who show a compelling reason, or even a merely rational reason;":1
since fetuses are not persons, adherence to every detail of traditional
equal protection doctrine would appear unnecessary.
Every attempt to regulate abortion runs the risk of prompting a re-
surgence of back-room abortions performed by untrained personnel
under dangerous and unsanitary conditions." 2  A number of con-
siderations indicate that this suggested type of regulation will not result
in such a resurgence, however. First, the women who formerly had
the strongest motivation to obtain an illegal abortion-unmarried
mothers, career women, women with very large families, and women
who carried fetuses likely to be deformed" 3-are unlikely to be the
same women who request selective abortion. For the former class
of women, an unwanted child can indeed go a long way toward de-
stroying the mother's life." 4 But a woman in the latter class is willing,
The Five-Year Revolution 329; Note, Abortion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. CIN. L.
REV. 441 (1973).
110. Even constitutionally protected rights may be waived, provided the waiver is
knowing, voluntary, and free from coercion. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (waiver of fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966) (waiver of fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination); Van Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948)
(waiver of sixth amendment right to counsel).
I 11. Abortion of a defective fetus was recognized as legitimate even before Roe and
Doe, see note 32 supra, and should meet even the compelling interest test.
112. The Court in Roe discussed the dangers of the illegal "abortion mill." 410
U.S. at 150. See also note 115 infra and authorities cited therein.
113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Abortion: The Five-Year Revolution
313 (describes the sharp increase in number of abortions necessitated by the epidemic
of rubella in 1964). Many other environmental or genetic factors can result in a de-
formed fetus. E.g., Lowe, Congenital Malformations and the Problem of Their Con-
trol, 1972 BRrr. MED. J. 515; Vukowitch, The Dawning of the Brave New World-
Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189. The plight of
Ms. Finkbine, who had received the drug thalidomide but was unable to obtain a legal
abortion in the United States in 1962, attracted widespread public attention. See IFE,
Aug. 10, 1962, at 32; NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1962, at 54; SCIENCE NEWSLETTER, Aug.
18, 1962. at 99; TIME, July 13, 1962, at 52; U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 13, 1962,
at 89. See also Kenny, Thalidomide-Catalyst to Abortion Reform, 5 ARiz. L. RBv.
105 (1963).
114. See Ely 923.
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in fact desires, to have a child; the only question is which one. Such
a need will rarely approach the urgency of the unwed mother, the
working woman whose income is necessary to support her family, or
the woman who knows she is likely to have a badly deformed child
who will require life-long attention and supliort, and the pressure to
defy the law by resorting to an illegal back-room operation will accord-
ingly be less.
Of course, any statute that forces a woman to bear a child against
whom she may have strong feelings will pose a temptation to lawless-
ness.115 The Court in Roe recognized the intensity and legitimacy
of the woman's feelings" 6 and the absence of any compelling state
justification"'7 for the statutes then under consideration, and properly
struck down the offending legislation."18  But when the woman's deci-
sion consciously introduces new and less urgent elements, the Court's
decision might well be different, and a statute properly tailored to pro-
tect concrete and demonstrable state interests'" might well withstand
judicial scrutiny. 120
115. For a discussion of the manner in which restrictive abortion laws drove "large
numbers of desperate women into the hands of the very person from whom the law
seeks to shield them," see Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: A Failure of Lm,
50 A.B.AJ. 52 (1964). See also Moore, Unrealistic Abortion Laws, 1 CaIM. L. BULL.
3 (Dec. 1965).
116. 410 U.S. at 153.
117. Id. at 163.
118. Id. at 164.
119. See id. at 165.
120. There is no certainty, of course, that such legislation would not be struck down
by a Supreme Court decision. The foregoing survey of the interests involved only con-
cludes that on the basis of the "detriments" or interests identified in the Roe and Doe
opinions, some state legislation regulating selective abortion might be constitutionally
justifiable. A subsequent decision could find that a woman's interest in obtaining a
selective abortion also overrides the countervailing state and societal interests. Such
a decision would need to focus on the precise interests of the mother-and perhaps
the father, see note 109 supra-in refusing to permit the birth of a child of the "wrong"
sex or race. See notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text. Although many of the
detriments discussed in Roe and Doe are absent or are present only in an attenuated
form in selective abortion, see notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text, the mother's
interests are nevertheless substantial. A mother forced to bear a child of the "wrong"
race or sex may find motherhood unsatisfying and may even suffer psychological harm.
See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1971) (mother's health includes both
physical and psychological factors); accord, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
The unwanted child may develop a stunted or warped personality. The couple's mar-
riage may suffer. In extreme cases the state may even be forced to assume the care
of an abandoned, delinquent, or mentally ill child rejected by his or her parents. These
possibilities should not be minimized, and any statute drafted to deal with selective
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
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Regulation of selective abortion raises issues that force us to chart
unfamiliar territory, issues that require us to abandon the familiar
realm of means and begin to think in terms of ultimate ends. This
is a dilemma, however, that advancing technology will thrust upon us
on many fronts in the years ahead. To cite but one example, recent
developments suggest that behavior-modification techniques have
been perfected to the point where it is now possible to alter the re-
sponses of a prisoner or inmate in fundamental and permanent ways,
without resorting to such drastic and constitutionally suspect means as
lobotomy, drug therapy, and electroshock treatment. 12 1  If the human
personality can be modified by means that do not violate the Bill of
Rights, the question then becomes, what range of target personalities
is permissible? What kind of person can be created?122  Human
engineering through selective abortion paints this dilemma in the
starkest possible terms, since it involves the very creation of human
beings of certain types rather than modification of individuals already
in existence. The extent to which problems of ends, like those of
means, are subject to constitutional constraints is thus one that is criti-
abortion should take these interests into account, tailoring any limitations of the par-
ents' freedom to choose only to meet compelling state interests that are clearly formu-
lated and defined. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 163 (1973).
Subsequent decisions may base the right to abortion not on privacy but on the
mother's right to choose. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Such an approach would undoubtedly make regulation of any abortion decision
highly problematical at best.
121. Moya, Parsons & Chaukin, The Scientific and Non-Scientific Manipulation of
Behavior, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. - (1974).
122. Very few judicial opinions seem to have addressed the permissibility of the ob-
jectives of a coercive, therapeutic, or other personality-shaping program, as distin-
guished from a review of the means employed. The recent federal case of Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (state mental institution must tailor treat-
ment program toward normalization of patients; goals must be clearly articulated and
justifiable; therapy may not be aimed at conditioning the patient to accept his or her
institutionalized status), is one of the few cases on record to have undertaken a review
of objectives. A committee of the National Academy of Science recognized the prob-
lems inherent in regulation of ends when it wrote:
Man, although potentially able to select his own genetic constitution, has not
yet made use of this power. . . . But who shall decide what is desirable?
How much genotypic and phenotypic variability would be optimal in the human
society?. . . And to whom would society entrust such decisions?
COMMITTEE ON LIFE SCIENCES, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, BIOLOGY, AND THE
FUTURE OF MAN 926 (P. Handler ed. 1970). See also Civil Liberties, Mar. 1974, at
5, col. 1.Washington University Open Scholarship
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cal to the future interface of law and technology; the outcome, for
better or worse, will have much to say about the shape of mankind's
future. Such problems can be dealt with willy-nilly as they arise, or
can be studied now, while they are still in the germinal stages and
the law of ends has not yet hardened into a fixed pattern. For the
reasons discussed in this Article, it is not too early to begin sober re-
flection on the manner in which these ultimate questions of human
personality vis-A-vis public and private preferences should be resolved.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss2/1
